RITCHEY PRODUCE CO. v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
707 N.E.2I 871 (OHIO 1999) by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 10
Spring 4-1-2000
RITCHEY PRODUCE CO. v. OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES 707 N.E.2I 871 (OHIO 1999)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
RITCHEY PRODUCE CO. v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 707 N.E.2I 871 (OHIO 1999), 6 Wash. &
Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J. 145 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol6/iss1/10
RITCHEY PRODUCE Co. v. OHIo DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
707 N.E.2I 871 (OHIo 1999)
FACTS
In 1990, Nadim Ritchey ("Ritchey") applied to the Ohio Department of
Administrative Services ("ODAS") for minority business enterprise ("MBE")
certification of Ritchey Produce Company, Inc.' On the MBE application,
Ritchey indicated on the first page that he was "Oriental," and he indicated on
the second page that his country of origin was Lebanon.2 Ritchey Produce
received MBE certification for twelve months beginning August 31, 1991 and
was recertified for three succeeding twelve-month periods based on Ritchey's
status as a member of a qualified minority group.' While certified as an MBE,
ODAS awarded Ritchey Produce a state procurement contract under the MBE
set-aside program. This contract included the state's orders for fresh fruits
and vegetables from July 1995 through September 1997V In 1995, Ritchey
refiled for MBE certification.' ODAS advised Ritchey of its intent to deny his
application because Ritchey Produce was not owned by a member of a
qualified minority group.7 Ohio's Revised Code requires that a certain
percentage of the state's construction and procurement contracts be set aside
for competitive bidding by MBEs only.' MBEs are defined under Ohio
Revised Code section 122.7 1(E)(1) as enterprises owned and controlled by a
member of an economically disadvantaged group comprised of "Blacks,
American Indians, Hispanics, and Orientals [sic]."' At an ODAS hearing, the
1. Ritchey Produce Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Serv., 707 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ohio 1999).
2. Ritchey, 707 N.E.2d at 875.
3. 707 N.E.2d at 875-76.
4. Id. at 876.
5. Id. at 877.
6. Id. at 876.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 874. The Director of Administrative Services "shall select a number of contracts with an
aggregate value of approximately five per cent of the total estimated value of contracts to be awarded in the
current fiscal year. The director shall set aside the contracts so selected for bidding by minority business
enterprises only." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 123.151 (C)(1) (West 1994). With respect to state procurement
contracts, the Director of Administrative Services "shall select a number of [purchases made through
competitive selection], the aggregate value of which equals approximately fifteen per cent of the estimated
total value of all such purchases to be made in the current fiscal year. The director shall set aside the
purchases selected for competition only by minority business enterprises, as defined in division (EXI) of
section 122.71 of the Revised Code." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.081 (A).
9. Id. at 875. A "minority business enterprise" is defined as an "individual, partnership,
corporation or joint venture of any kind that is owned and controlled by United States citizens, residents
of Ohio, who are members of one of the following econzomically disadvantaged groups: Blacks, American
Indians, Hispanics, and Orientals." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.7 1(E)(1). "Owned and controlled" is
further defined as "at least fifty-one per cent of the business.. . is owned by persons who belong to one or
more of the groups set forth in division (E)(1) of this section, and that such owners have control over the
management and day-to-day operations ofthe business and an interest in the capital, assets, and profits and
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examiner concluded that Ritchey was not "Oriental" and that the company was
not minority owned for purposes of the MBE program.'0 Upon Ritchey's
appeal, the Court of Common Pleas found that "the ODAS order denying
Ritchey Produce's request for recertification violated the equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth" and Fourteenth" Amendments .... , Upon ODAS's
appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the Court of Common Pleas
finding.'4 The appellate court determined that Ohio's MBE program "appears
to be based on the presumption that Caucasians and other minority groups are
not disadvantaged, socially or economically, but that all members of the listed
minority groups are socially and economically disadvantaged."'" Relying on
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena," the court concluded that "the state's
MBE program is a race per se classification which... was unconstitutionally
applied to deny [Ritchey] MBE certification."' 7 The appeals court also
concluded that the goal of the MBE program should be to maximize
opportunity for all economically or socially disadvantaged Ohioans."
HOLDING
The Ohio Supreme Court held that
the provisions of [Ohio Revised Code section] 125.081 requiring that
approximately fifteen percent of the state's purchasing contracts be set aside
for competitive bidding by [MBEs] only and the provisions of [Ohio Revised
losses of the business proportionate to their percentage of ownership.. ." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
122.71(EX2).
10. Ritchey Produce Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Serv., No. 97APE04-567,1997 Ohio App. LEXIS
4590, at *1 (Oct. 07, 1997).
11. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
13. 707 N.E.2d at 876. In Ohio, a Court of Common Pleas is a court of general jurisdiction that
hears appeals from most administrative agencies. The Court of Appeals is the court of general appellate
review for lower court decisions. The Supreme Court is the highest court and has final appellate
jurisdiction for lower court decisions. WANT'S FEDERAL-STATE COURT DECTORY -2000 EDmoN, 191
(Want's Publishing Co. 1999).
14. See generally 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590 (affrming judgment of the trial court).
15. ld. at *5-6.
16. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applied
to all governmental classifications based on race).
17. 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590 at *7 (construing Adarand to mean "that race may, in some
circumstances, create a presumption of disadvantage, but that other races cannot be excluded based solely
on statutory presumptions such as the ones in R.C. 122.71(EXI).").
18. Id. at *7.
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Code section] 122.71(E) defining [MBE] with explicit reference to race are
constitutional as applied to deny [MBE] status to a business owned and
controlled by a person of Lebanese ancestry.'9
The court further held that "Ohio's [MBE] program as it relates to the state's
purchasing contracts is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional
muster."20  Accordingly, the court reinstated ODAS's denial of MBE
recertification for Ritchey Produce.2
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court narrowed the issue to "whether
Ohio's MBE Program, as administratively applied and as written, violates the
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.. .."I The court
then determined what standard of review is appropriate for this issue.'
Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled with the tension
between the equal protection clause and the use of race-based measures, the
court reviewed twenty years' worth of U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing
with benign or race-based governmental action.' The court concluded that
the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the question of appropriate standard of
review by "finding that the standard for all governmental classifications based
on race is the strict scrutiny standard of review."'
For the MBE set-aside program to survive strict scrutiny, "the state's race-
based program must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and
the means chosen by the state to effectuate its purposes must be sufficiently
narrowly tailored."2" The court accepted "that a state has a compelling interest
in remedying past and present effects of identified racial discrimination within
its jurisdiction where the state itself was involved in the discriminatory
practices. '  To determine whether Ohio established a compelling state
interest, the court reviewed the "factual predicate offered in support of the
program."' This factual predicate consisted of documentation and judicial
19. 707 N.E.2d at 928.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 879.
23. Id. at 885.
24. Id. at 885-913 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Fullilove v.
Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adaran4 515 U.S. 200).
25. Id. at 885.
26. Id. at 913.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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decisions dating back to 1967 that established Ohio's participation in a pattern
of discriminatory practices against minorities in the area of state contracting.29
The court also reviewed an early form of affirmative action for minority
contractors in Ohio,' and reviewed the state's interest in adopting the current
MBE program that was enacted in 1980.11 The Court found such evidence
sufficient to establish that Ohio's General Assembly had "a 'strong basis' in
evidence to support its conclusion that Ohio's program was necessary to
redress a pattern of discriminatory exclusion of minorities from state
contracting opportunities and, thus, had a compelling governmental interest
for adopting the MBE program."
32
The court then distinguished the evidence relied on by the Richmond City
.Council in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co from the evidence supporting Ohio's
MBE program.3 In Croson, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the city's
reliance on statements concerning discrimination in Richmond and in the
nation provided little probative value in establishing identified discrimination
in the Richmond construction industry.34 The court also found that
Richmond's reliance on statistical disparity between the number of prime
contracts awarded to MBEs and the percentage of minorities in the city was
misplaced. The U.S. Supreme Court further determined that congressional
findings of nationwide discrimination in the construction industry were of
"limited value" for supporting the existence of discrimination in Richmond.36
None of the evidence presented indicated identifiable discrimination in the
Richmond construction industry; thus, in Croson, the Richmond City Counsel,
failed the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny.
37
In contrast to Croson, Ohio's General Assembly enacted the MBE
program based on specific information that indicated identifiable
discrimination in Ohio.38
[The evidence included] past judicial decisions confirming the existence of
discrimination in state contracting and establishing the state's acquiescence
in such discriminatory practices, executive findings of discrimination in state
contracting opportunities, administrative findings of the need for affirmative
29. Id. at 914-17.
30. The affirnative action program contained a two year "sunset" provision. Id. at 915 (part of "a
biennial capital-improvement appropriations Act").
31. Id. at 915-18.
32. Id. at 914.
33. 707 N.E.2d at 919.
34. Id. (citing Croson, at 488-500).
35. Id. (citing Croson, at 501-03).
36. Id. (citing Croson, at 504).
37. id. (citing Croson, at 505).
38. Id.
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action, testimony of opponents and proponents of minority set-asides, and a
host of relevant statistical evidence showing the severe numerical imbalance
in the amount of business the state did with minority-owned enterprises."
The court stated that this "evidentiary mosaic ... is precisely the type of
probative evidence of identified racial discrimination found lacking in
Croson."'4 Based on this evidence, the court found that Ohio's General
Assembly had a compelling interest in enacting the MBE program.4 The
court noted that the lower courts had ignored the state's compelling interest
in having adopted the MBE program.
42
The court next addressed Ritchey's challenge that the MBE program was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored.43 Ritchey did not argue that the MBE
program was overinclusive, but rather instead argued that the program was
underinclusive." As to Ritchey's challenge that the MBE program was
underinclusive, the court noted that Ohio's General Assembly, at the time of
the program's enactment, considered information concerning the four specific
statutorily qualified minority groups.4 5 The court stated that "if the General
Assembly had decided to randomly pick additional minority groups for
inclusion into the MBE program... the MBE program would almost certainly
fail under strict scrutiny." 4 The court further noted that Ritchey, for example,
never challenged the facial validity of the MBE program,47 but rather
Ritchey's "only objectives were to be included in the program." 4  The
program was designed to "ameliorate the effects of past, documented racial
discrimination" that detrimentally affected "the racial or ethnic minority
groups listed in [Ohio Revised Code section] 122.71(E)(1)." The court
emphasized that the MBE program was not designed to benefit all of Ohio's
citizenry."
In weighing the general appropriateness of the MBE program, the court
made several "general observations."" The court observed that: the current
39. id.
40. id. at 919-20.
41. Id. at 920.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 921-22.
44. Id. at 922 (stating ... as to the question of overinclusiveness, we do not view appellee's
arguments in this case as even challenging the MBE program on that ground.").
45. Id.
46. id.
47. Id. at 923.
48. Id. at 922.
49. Id. at 923.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 923-25.
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program was enacted only after several other programs had failed;52 the
program is flexible;53 "the numerical goals of the program have a direct
relationship to Ohio's contracting market;"' "[nionminority contractors are
not wholly precluded from participation in contracts set aside for MBEs;"
the program "contains administrative definitions and procedures to ensure
participation by qualified MBEs only;"and there are "criminal penalties to
discourage unjust participation in the MBE program; '56 the definition of
MBE "contains an appropriate geographic limitation for the program" (i.e.
"controlled by U.S. citizens, residents of Ohio");-" the operation of the
"program is subject to continuing reassessment and reevaluation; 5.. "finally,
the burdens imposed on non-MBEs by virtue of the set-aside requirements are
relatively light."5 9 The court, guided by these "general observations," found
that "Ohio's MBE program is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass
constitutional muster."60
After determining that the MBE program met the strict scrutiny test, the
court examined "whether a person of Lebanese ancestry is included within the
meaning of the term Oriental."'" The court analyzed the ODAS hearing
examiner's determination.' The hearing examiner reviewed statutory
constructions and definitions considered in DLZ Corp. v. Department of
Administrative Services,63 finding that "Oriental" does not include people of
Lebanese descent." The court agreed that "the common, ordinary, and
everyday meaning of the term 'Orientals,' at least as that term is generally
used and understood today, simply does not refer to people of Lebanese
ancestry or, geographically, to the country of Lebanon."
6
Although the court held Ohio's MBE program constitutional, the court
limited it holding to "the area of state procurement contracting."' The court









61. Id. at 926.
62. Id.
63. DLZ Corp. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Serv. 658 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio 1995).
64. 707 N.E.2d at 926-27.
65. Id. at 927.
66. Id. at 927-28.
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limited the holding to avoid a direct conflict with an order previously issued
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in a
separate case that dealt with state construction contracts.",
CONCLUSION
This case presents several troubling issues." First, two United States
District Courts previously held that the enabling law for the MBE program in
state construction contracts, Ohio Revised Code section 123.151, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' One of the two federal
courts, the Southern District of Ohio, expressly denounced the Ritchey
Produce opinion."0 In condemning the opinion, U.S. District Judge James L.
Graham called Ohio's MBE program "blatantly unconstitutional." '7 Judge
Graham opined that if the MBE program survives ". . . non-minority
businesses which seek to do business with the state will be harmed by being
excluded from the opportunity to bid on state contracts solely because of their
race." '2 To avoid "conflict" with the federal court opinion, the Ohio Supreme
Court limited the holding in Ritchey Produce to "the area of state
procurement contracting."73 Although the state and federal cases deal with
different types of contracts (procurement and construction contracts,
respectively), Ohio "relied on the same evidence and the same legal arguments
to justify both programs."74  Thus, Ritchey Produce has questionable
precedential value.
Second, the court avoided a traditional canon of construction in
determining the meaning of the term "Orientals." Both the hearing examiner
67. Associated Gen. Contrs. of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, No. C2-98-943, 1998 WL 812241 at * I (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 30,1998) (determining that "Ohio Revised Code Section 123.151 and all rules, regulations and
practices promulgated thereunder, which provide for and implement racial or ethnic preference provisions
for the awarding of State construction contracts and State construction subcontracts violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are therefore, invalid,
null and void...").
68. One issue not discussed in this note is the political use of the courts to overturn legislative
enactments. During the early 1990s Ohio Governor George Voinovich pushed for MBE contract awarding
based on economic and social disadvantage, instead of race or ethnicity. Apparently, the Governor was
unable to move his agenda in the General Assembly. See Ohio's Race-Based Incentives Unlawful,' TE
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 31, 1996. at IA.; The Governor requested ODAS to appeal the Court of Common
Pleas' holding in Ritchey in order to have "a clear signal from the courts [of) just what they think of our
state statute." Voinovich Seeks Ruling on Opinion, THE DAYTON DAILY NEws, Nov. 2, 1996, at 2B.
69. See Associated Gen. Contrs. of Ohio, 1998 WL 812241, at *1-2; F. Buddie Contracting, Ltd.
v. Cuyahoga Comm. College Dist., 31 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574, 584 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
70. Associated Gen. Contrs. of Ohio, Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741,744-45 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
71. Id.at745.
72. Id. at 771.
73. 707 N.E.2d at 928.
74. 50 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
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and the court used a modem definition of "Orientals" instead of using the
legislature's intended definition. The term "Orientals" used in Ohio Revised
Code section 122.7 1(E)(1) is not defined in the statute."s The ODAS hearing
examiner based his determination of what "Oriental" means on the Ohio
Administrative Code76 (which was made effective one year after Ohio Revised
Code section 122.7 1(E)(1)), case law clarifying the Administrative Code's
definition,77 and common dictionary78 definitions.79 In upholding the hearing
examiner's determination, the Ohio Supreme Court discounted another
dictionary definition," the opinion of one of the appeals court judges,8 Mr.
Ritchey's own belief," and amici's claim that "Oriental" included individuals
of Lebanese descent and geographically, Lebanon. 3 The court did not
examine legislative history to determine what Ohio's General Assembly
intended the term "Orientals" to mean. Using modem definitions instead of
the legislature's intended definition appears to undermine the validity of the
state's compelling interest in remedying identified past discrimination.
Finally, the continued use of Ohio's MBE program (without durational
limit) may be inappropriate. The Ohio Supreme Court stated that when a
statute is challenged as unconstitutional, it is the court's duty to liberally
construe the statute to save it from constitutional infirmities." In its effort to
find the MBE program constitutional, the court failed to consider whether the
program was still necessary. The court should have considered the program's
unlimited duration, as well as evidence indicating that the program was
outdated, before making a final determination.
Justice Powell stated in Fullilove that a race-based remedy must be
appropriately limited so it "will not last longer than the discriminatory effects
it is designed to eliminate."85  Ohio's program contains no "sunset"
provisions; thus, it has an unlimited duration. Moreover, since enactment in
1980, neither the Ohio legislature nor a state court has substantially altered the
75. 707 N.E.2d at 926.
76. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 123:2-15-0l(A)(9) (stating that "Orientals" means "all persons having
origins in any of the original people of the Far East, including China, Japan and Southeast Asia").
77. 658 N.E.2d at 31 (holding that "Oriental" includes people from India).
78. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COl _GIATE DICrfONARY, 832 (1987), THE RANDOM HousE
DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1365 (2d Ed. 1987), WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DIcIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1591 (1976).
79. 707 N.E.2d at 926.
80. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY, 929 (2d Ed. 1989).
81. 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590 at *8-9 (Tyack, J., concurring).
82. 707 N.E.2d at 882.
83. Id. at 884.
84. Id. at 881.
85. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring); Powell's words are quoted by the majority
in Adarand. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238.
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MBE program.86
The Ohio Supreme Court based its holding on evidence that was at least
twenty years old. 7 Federal case law suggests that evidence of discrimination
that is 14-years, 8 18-years, 9 and 19-years-old ° is too old to be useful.9
Current evidence suggests that the Ohio MBE program actually discriminates
against non-minorities.92 Moreover, the MBE program benefits only a small
number of qualified minorities.93 Thus, in an attempt to liberally construe the
statute, the court upholds the constitutionality of a program that engages in
reverse discrimination.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Benjamin N. Hargy
86. Cf. 707 N.E.2d at 925 (discussing continuing reassessment and reevaluation of Ohio Revised
Code § 123.151) with 50 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (discussing a lack of serious reconsideration of Ohio Revised
Code section 123.151).
87. 707 N.E.2d at 914.
88. Brunet v. City of Columbus, I F.3d 390,409 (6th Cir. 1993).
89. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73,76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
90. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 989 F.2d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1993).
91. 50 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
92. Id. at 768-70 (discussing Complaint filed in Henry Painting Co. v. Ohio State Univ., No. C-2-
94-0196 (S.D. Ohio).
93. Id. at 770 (citing REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, State Sponsored Equal Opportunity Programs In
Ohio (1995) (study showing that 80 percent of funds set-aside for MBEs went to only five percent of
eligible MBEs)).

